Ana Bazac[1]
Extended abstract for the PowerPoint presented at Science Challenges in the 21st Century, Conference of CRIFST/RCHPST, Iași Branch, July 9–11, 2026
The conceptual framework is given by three types of concepts: precaution (prudence and prevention) as normative organisers of the man-environment relationships, science and technology in their structural unity (technoscience) as efficient “technical” organisers of the man-environment relationships, and power relations/power interests as efficient social organisers of the man-environment relationships. The junction of these three types of concepts configures the problem and even suggests a (philosophical) solution: if man’s environment/the world as such is the result of man’s highly proved and verified scientific and technological activity, this activity as such must follow the – banal for us in our individual behaviour – requirements of rationality: precaution/prevention.
Why? Because without a precautionary premise – foresight (from present aims to representations of future actions/situations), anticipation (from representations of future situations to present actions) – the human actions in general and technoscience especially could generate random turns with unexpected, and even harmful consequences.
The above presentation of concepts shows that if technoscience is the means of cognitive and practical transformation of man’s environment/world, the ends of this transformation are given/decided by extra technoscience entities and forces.
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Obviously, the precautionary point of view is integrated in technoscience, too. Here, it concerns all the moments, actions and structures created within the scientific-technological research. The precautionary point of view, as the technoscience in general, involve “technical” aspects of preparation of the entire process of research “and development”, that is, of experiments, theoretical modelling, prototyping, real-world feasibility studies having as scope the practical application. However, if the principles of technical aspects of precaution are technical/professional, their application as such depends not only on scientific/“technical” requirements but also – and even at a significant extent – on extra-professional constraints. We can surmise that of course these extra-professional constraints would not danger the value of technoscience’ results, at least because there is a huge competition for selling these results: nevertheless, sometimes they would.
Therefore, these extra-professional constraints act also at the level of results as such of technoscience: actually, this is the topic of the PowerPoint.
The professionals of technoscience always deal with a permanent up-to-dating of their theories/facts by correcting the anterior presumptions and argumentations. But they eschew from this corrective process the social cause of power relations, and thus sever the epistemological causes of situations and their understanding from the social ones. But this is an epistemological mistake, because the power relations are ontological marks, and not scandalous elements brought about by some non-conformist “out-of-date” thinkers.
Well, philosophy is necessary just in order to complement the from within views of technoscience with the from without perspective that considers the complex technoscience-society system. The technoscience-philosophy confluence is not an artificial dream of some philosophers but its – already historical proven – feature brought about with the high development of science and technology: when this development involves crises which, inherently, are approached also by philosophical analysis. Obviously, this philosophical analysis can avoid the integration of from within/epistemology of technoscience and the from without/sociology of technoscience standpoints. But in fact, this integration gives “the concept” – the holistic but deep, therefore, concrete, therefore, true outlook about a so social problem. Hegel punctuated that the avoiding of the social character of man-environment relationships corresponds to the abstract, first phasis of the concept, and not at all to the authentic phasis of the concrete concept.
Accordingly, the professionals of technoscience cannot be neutral towards the extra-technoscience constraints and forces. Within their professional pursuit of valuable theories and findings they obviously respect the requirements of scientific and technological research. Or differently put, even though the professionals working in the present organisation of society cannot express their critical point of view at the workplace, they can, and must – let’s remember Kant – do this in their private life, as citizens. And this is epistemologically possible just because the corrective reasoning is constitutive for the human being: man is the only known corrective animal.
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Therefore, the hypothesis presented by the PowerPoint is that the ancient concept of prudence had the universalistic feature the present precautionary principle has not.
In common parlance, there is a semantic superposition of the three concepts. In fact, their contents – historical, as of every concept – show distinctions. In other words, the historical models of conceptual contents emphasise the historical integration of concepts in the real life.
The origin of our triptych (prudence, prevention, precaution) – in the history of ancient philosophy – is prudence: 1) to think before acting (pro-meteia), 2) to examine variants / alternatives, 3) to choose the best one (to anticipate), 4) to act accordingly (prudence – towards any action, not only the risky ones). Accordingly, prudence means prevention in order to give an as coherent basis for human actions as possible. Prevention concerns the anterior decisions to actions. Since the basis of the human life is controlled from the standpoint of prudence, it is then easier to prevent individual turns – actions and results – generated by hastiness. And prudence was as much an individual attitude as a collective/social one: the state ought to be based on a political regime of checks and balances where the rational discourse confronting arguments related not simply to individual interests but even foremost to consequences for the whole society, was cardinal. The rational deliberative manner of decisions gave to prudence a holistic amplitude.
In its turn, precaution – is preventing the bad actions and consequences. Although preventing the bad actions is an implicit aspect of the choice of the best action – according to its consequences – thus it belongs to the ante/preparatory moment of action, at the modern industrial scale it proved to be a post moment: after the agglomeration of evil consequences.
“The discovery” of the principle of precaution – is the sign that prudence was weak, bad actions have already taken place. Losses have already occurred: from serious/extremely serious to irreversible. The basis of human life became marked by randomness and cascading evil consequences. What before was an efficient correction of individual imprudent actions – coherent with the prudential basis –, has now become a hierarchical system of patching up that, nevertheless, is not able to consolidate a prudential basis.
The modern principle of precaution – tends to minimise losses, thus risks, but the technological causes should not be separated from the social-political ones.
Aristotle’s model of prudence versus “diseases”/abnormal states determined by different degrees of lack of prudence, fuels our view that is better to prevent decisions and actions which lead to bad results, than to correct/repair already occurred bad actions and results. In fact, individual preventions of individual actions are efficient when this preventive stance accords with a basis that it itself does not need to be corrected, deviated or even annulled.
Therefore, the proposed concepts signal paradigmatic frameworks for human decisions and actions.
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The mentioned correlations of these concepts with human decisions and actions insert them within the ontology of the human being.
- Prudence is an ontological principle, explaining the existence of the human being:
– because man is the main explaining factor of the world (realism is the sine qua non assumption of knowledge, there is certainly an objective, external world to us, but the world as we know it, as it is ordered, made coherent, familiar to us, is only according to man), and
– his prudence posits and brings order in the world made by him, and this means that prudence is also putting order in the existence of man: it confronts and alleviates the human vulnerability, assuring predictability, controllability, possibility to improve.
If prudence is an ontological principle, it results that precaution – not as a synonym of prudence but as an emergency solution in man-made imbalances and crises (as in its contemporary “discovery”) – is a kind of deviation from prudence.
Prevention is a conclusion of prudence; it is not independent from it.
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Would it be too hazardous to put near prudence other concepts having ontological functions? The PowerPoint still advances three kinds of ontological concepts.
- Technology/artifacts and their making is the externalised means of human construction. Science – as substantiated knowledge – is inherently another ontological concept, being here both “the means” of technology and a component of “technoscience”. Actually, the technoscience, emphasised especially from the second half of the 20th century on, reveals its dialectical relation with prudence: prudence is not a brake against the necessary and structural freedom of scientific and technological research, but this freedom manifests within the frame of prudence. On the other hand, the modern power relations imprint within this relationship trends which may alter it.
- The power relations: without the power relations we cannot explain the world of man, his features themselves evolving according to the power relations.
- However, the two concepts expressly related to the present consideration of the precautionary principle are crisis and risk. They are specific only to the human facts: the attitudes towards natural events are ways of human thinking and relationing with the external world. Not this world is in crisis and would have some risky features, but the humans estimate the world in a way or another according to its influence on them. And what is more important, the natural imbalances are mostly man-made: so, people define, for instance, that nature is in crisis because of the disequilibria induced by humans in nature.
The same is with risk. The relationship of man with the world may be risky, not the world as such. But risk is a situation when people did not prevent the bad turns occurred in their relationships with the world.
Therefore, the control and minimisation of risks involve both the material-energetic transformation of imbalanced basis (technology, nature) of the human life and the social transformation in such a way that the basis itself becomes balanced.
Risk is a possible paroxysmal imbalance and an emergency situation the humans are aware about. In this, risk is a criterion of preventive approach. Risk is only possible, crisis is already real. In all case, crisis-risk-preventive approach is the paradigm of the precautionary principle.
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When passing from philosophical preparation to practice – but practice involves and includes theory – all the above-mentioned concepts begin to live in the real world of historical complexity and power relations. This life means their integration in a theoretical and practical critique of the crisis-risk-preventive approach specific to this contemporary era that “discovered” –late, too late – the precautionary principle, but that does not apply it / applies it in a structural insufficient way.
The PowerPoint only suggests this critique, but underlines the ideological attitudes towards the perspective given by the complex crises-risks-precaution. The technophile and technophobe attitudes are extremes which both support the continuity of fragmentary prevention and the rejection of the transformative approach of coherent holistic preventive human actions. Neither the technophile optimism nor the fatalist/ lazy solution of copying the past (“there were crises and risks, and relative solving, so it will be”) are able to bring a holistic predictability and prevention.
The intention was here to put problems at a conceptual level, and the words scattered throughout the PowerPoint may help. The challenge lies outside this philosophical detour, in the understanding of the logic of the present functioning of the precautionary principle: and of its management.
[1] Professor, Division of Logic, Methodology ad Philosophy of Science and Technology, Romanian Committee of History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Romanian Academy
ana_bazac@hotmai.com
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